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THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 
James S. Fishkin* 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CON-
STITUTIONAL INQUIRY. By Michel Rosenfeld. New Haven: y ale 
University Press. 1991. Pp. vii, 373. $30. 
Two decades into the active revival of liberal political philosophy, 
a revival that can be dated from the publication of John Rawls' A 
Theory of Justice in 1971,1 Michel Rosenfeld2 offers an ambitious ac-
count of why all the rival approaches are defective and why a proposal 
of his own, built around a combination of theories from Lawrence 
Kohlberg and Jiirgen Habermas, provides the ultimate solution to the 
theory of justice. He then goes on to apply this apparatus to the most 
vexing issue of current public debate: affirmative action. 
Two main questions arise in attempting to evaluate this work. 
First, how adequate is Rosenfeld's theoretical framework compared to 
all the rivals he proposes to dispatch? Second, does his theoretical 
framework support the position on affirmative action he would have us 
adopt? 
Rosenfeld divides liberal theories of justice into libertarian, egalita-
rian, contractarian, and utilitarian approaches. While this classifica-
tion does succeed in capturing the main alternatives, it is not 
intellectually tidy. Contractarian refers to a decision procedure, either 
an actual or a hypothetical social contract, employed as an apparatus 
of justification. The terms egalitarian, utilitarian, and libertarian refer 
to substantive positions rather than to the decision procedure support-
ing those substantive positions. The difficulty is that prominent exam-
ples of substantive positions fall in the egalitarian, utilitarian, or 
libertarian categories that are supported by a social contract method 
of justification. Hence Rosenfeld's classifications, which organize a 
large portion of the discussion, produce more confusion than clarity. 
More specifically, Rawls' original position, which bids individuals 
to evaluate social institutions from behind a hypothetical veil of igno-
rance, has become the paradigmatic contractarian . theory. Yet, as 
Rawls admits, one can easily deploy a variation of the original position 
• Darrell K. Royal Regents Chair in Ethics and American Society, Professor of Govern-
ment, Law, and Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. B.A. 1970, Yale College; Ph.D. 
(Political Science) 1975, Yale University; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1976, Cambridge University, Eng-
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in support of utilitarianism. 3 Would a Harsanyi-style advocate of av-
erage utilitarianism (justified by a gambling argument from the origi-
nal position) fit into the contractarian or the utilitarian category?4 
The strategy of justification is contractarian, but the substantive con-
clusion is obviously utilitarian. 
The matter becomes even more confused by Rosenfeld's adoption 
of Douglas Rae's categories for understanding the range of "egalita-
rian" theories. 5 Within Rae's categories, Rawls' "maximin" theory of 
justice is a species of equality. 6 Is Rawls' theory then a contractarian 
theory because it is based on the original position, or is it an egalita-
rian theory because it is advocating a form of equality (at least accord-
ing to the categories adopted by Rosenfeld)? Furthermore, if social 
contract theories are characterized by a decision process under actual 
or hypothetjcal circumstances, then it is arguable that Robert 
Nozick's theory, offered by Rosenfeld as the paradigmatic libertarian 
theory, is also properly classified as a social contract theory. Nozick 
takes Lockean assumptions to a hypothetical state of nature and shows 
how a nonrights-violating decision process in that state of nature 
would yield a minimal state. 7 On some grounds, such a libertarian 
theory is social contract; in terms of its substantive principles, how-
ever, it is libertarian. These categories seem to support classification 
of Nozick's theory as both social contract and libertarian, Harsanyi's 
theory as both social contract and utilitarian, and Rawls' theory as 
both social contract and egalitarian. The truth is that most of the con-
temporary revival in theories of justice is based, ultimately, on varia-
tions of the social contract. To separate egalitarian, utilitarian, and 
libertarian approaches from the social contract is simply to cut off sub-
stantive positions from the strategy of justification most commonly 
used to support them. 
Rosenfeld's own proposal is based on "stage six," a decision proce-
dure that he borrows from the late Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg ex-
plicitly classifies Rawls' original position as the best example of stage 
six. 8 Indeed, Kohlberg says arguments from the original position and 
those from stage six are substantively equivalent.9 Yet Rawls' original 
3. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 12, 163-65. 
4. As Harsanyi shows, and Rawls acknowledges, if one takes expected value as the measure 
of self-interest from behind the veil of ignorance, then one maximizes choice behind the veil by 
choosing average utility rather than Rawls' proposal. For more on this "gambling argument," 
see JOHN c. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES 
AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 48-51 (1977). 
5. DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALmES 12-13, 15-19 (1981). 
6. Id. at 128-29. 
7. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA pt. 1 (1974). 
8. Lawrence Kohlberg, Justice as Reversibility, in 5 PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
257 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds., 1979). 
9. Id. at 263. 
May 1992] The Quest for Justice 1349 
position is the paradigm case of a social contract argument. Rosenfeld 
somehow believes that he can reject the category of social contract 
arguments and offer us stage six methods as an alternative. 
Stage six is the end point in Kohlberg's sequence of empirical 
stages of moral development.10 It consists in what Kohlberg calls 
"ideal role taking" or "moral musical chairs."11 Rosenfeld quotes this 
explanation of stage six from Kohlberg: 
a) The decider is to successively put himself imaginatively in the place of 
each other actor and consider the claims each would make from his 
point of view. 
b) Where claims in one party's shoes conflict with those in another's, 
imagine each party to trade places. If so, a party should drop his con-
flicting claim if it is based on nonrecognition of the other's point of 
view.12 
Kohlberg terms this process "moral musical chairs": 
Moral musical chairs means going around the circle of perspectives in-
volved in a moral dilemma to test one's claim of right or duty until only 
the equilibrated or reversible claims survive . . . . In moral chairs there is 
only one "winning" chair which all other players recognize if they play 
the game, the chair of the person with the prior claim of justice.13 
The key to moral musical chairs is "reversibility." As Rosenfeld 
explains: "Reversibility involves not only recognizing that others have 
their own perspective, but also trading positions with others to become 
aware of the nature and content of their perspectives, so that each 
gains a richer understanding of the other's objectives" (p. 249). 
Kohlberg's proposal is a kind of multiperson version of the Golden 
Rule with the proviso that the claims that are upheld are the ones that 
would survive each person imaginatively switching places with all the 
others affected by the choice. We imagine this process continuing un-
til agreement emerges among all the parties. 
Kohlberg gives a relatively straightforward example on which Ro-
senfeld also relies. 14 Kohlberg's moral reasoning studies made use of 
the so-called "Heinz" dilemma, the story of a woman with a seemingly 
incurable disease. A "druggist" in the same town has, however, in-
vented a cure for which he demands an exorbitant price. Heinz, the 
woman's husband, is unable to meet the druggist's demands and steals 
the drug in order to save his wife's life. Kohlberg cites an interview 
with an unnamed "Philosopher 3" as exemplifying stage six reasoning: 
Philosopher 3 is saying "start with the Golden Rule, change places with 
10. See, e.g., Lawrence Kohlberg, From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy 
and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development, in COGNmVE DEVELOPMENT AND 
EPISTEMOLOGY 151 (Theodore Mischel ed., 1971). 
11. Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 262. 
12. P. 249 (quoting Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 263). 
13. P. 249 (quoting Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 262). 
14. P. 250 (citing Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 259). 
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the wife in deciding. Is your denying a duty to save the woman's life 
consistent with the Golden Rule?" The wife, we may say, holds that her 
right to life is higher or prior to the druggist's right to property. She 
claims that the husband has a duty to steal to protect this right, since she 
cannot. The druggist denies that the husband has a duty to steal the 
drug and asserts he has a right to property equal to or greater than the 
wife's right to life.15 
The test is whether, when the druggist imaginatively changes 
places with the wife, he can uphold the claim that the property rights 
are more important than the human life: 
Is the druggist's denial of the husband's duty to steal reversible? No, this 
denial could not stand if he exchanged places with the wife. In the posi-
tion of the druggist, he holds his right to property higher than the wife's 
right to life. Presumably, however, if it were his life at stake, not the 
wife's the druggist would be rational enough to prefer his right to life 
over his property and would sacrifice his property. If the druggist tried 
to make his conception of rights and duties reversible by imaginatively 
changing places with the wife, he would give up the idea that the hus-
band had a duty to respect his property rights and would see that the 
husband had a duty towards his wife's life.16 
Kohlberg offers this as a simple paradigm case of stage six reason-
ing. Rosenfeld encounters more difficulty, however, when he applies 
this method to his difficult case of affirmative action. Rosenfeld ex-
plicitly wants to "concentrate on the most controversial practices" (p. 
47). For Rosenfeld "affirmative action shall be assumed henceforward 
to include some kind of preferential treatment" (p. 47). The contro-
versy comes in because "preferential treatment shall include the hiring 
or promotion of a minority or woman over a more qualified nonmi-
nority or male" {p. 48). 
Apply this kind of case to the same stage six reversibility test 
Kohlberg uses for the Heinz dilemma. If a "more qualified nonmi-
nority or male" switches places in moral musical chairs with a less 
qualified woman or minority male, it is hard to imagine that the 
nonminority or male will come to agree that the interests of the less 
qualified minority should override his interests. In the more limited 
circumstance where the minority or woman applicant were an actual 
victim of discrimination or came from a severely disadvantaged back-
ground, then we might be able to imagine a dialogue in which the 
nonminority or male would agree, when the two switched places, to a 
policy of preferential treatment. But Rosenfeld's principle is not de-
fined in this narrow way. It yields a kind of affirmative action that 
explicitly includes the most controversial cases, namely those where a 
less qualified minority, regardless of class background or income tests, 
is preferred over a more qualified nonminority or male. Whatever the 
15. Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 261-62. 
16. Id. at 262. 
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merits of such a policy, it is hard to imagine it emerging consensually 
from the role-switching of moral musical chairs. 
At some points Rosenfeld appears to invoke group rather than in-
dividual comparisons to support such a policy. For example, he con-
structs a dialogue with the "Innocent White Male" who may lose out 
from preferential treatment and concludes, "the more pervasive ra-
cism and sexism are in a given social setting, the more it would seem 
that affirmative action could play a key role in the transition of blacks 
and women from a status of inferiority to one of equality" (p. 325). If 
one is concerned with the general status of one group compared to 
another, then the preferential treatment argument takes on a different 
force. Yet it is difficult to see how one is to square such a concern for 
groups (defined by racial or gender categories) with the quite specific 
apparatus of reversible reciprocity or moral musical chairs involving 
individual role-switching. Rosenfeld admits as much when he adopts, 
at the beginning of his book, an individualistic restriction on admissi-
ble arguments. In endorsing a general postulate of equality as a pre-
supposition for the argument that follows, he tells us that "it is the 
individual rather than the group who is entitled to such equality" (p. 
4). The result is that "purely group-related justifications of affirmative 
action become unacceptable" (p. 4). More specifically, "a group pro-
portionment argument advocating affirmative action to eliminate glar-
ing group-related imbalances in a particular workforce would have to 
be rejected as inconsistent with the conviction that the individual 
rather than the group is the proper subject of equality" (pp. 4-5). The 
difficulty is that, within this individualistic postulate, the basis for 
preferential treatment of a group, as such, becomes quite tenuous. If 
Rosenfeld were to abandon his individualistic version of liberal theory, 
he could get the controversial conclusion he seeks. But he seems to 
want liberal individualism in theory and group preferences in practice, 
somehow believing that the latter can be made to follow from the 
former. 
Rosenfeld introduces an additional theoretical apparatus that 
might be intended to help at this point. He says Habermas' notion of 
the "ideal speech situation" provides "a critical tool designed to ex-
pose communication distortions and to indicate the directions in 
which a normatively oriented reconstructed dialogue relying on undis-
torted communication would lead" (p. 259). The idea is that some 
preferences result from self-deception or false consciousness and can 
be ruled out of the dialogue to which Kohlberg's reversible reciprocity 
or moral musical chairs applies. "[W]hat prevents one person from 
being able to appreciate the perspective of another may frequently be 
traceable to differences in power and ideology or to instances of decep-
tion and self-deception" (p. 260). We are supposed to reconstruct the 
relevant preferences by reference to what we would imagine being up-
held in a Habermasian ideal speech situation so as to rule out these 
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distortions. Rosenfeld gives the example of a black person objecting to 
the justice of affirmative action: 
That black participant would be the victim of self-deception, however, if 
the actual reason for his claim were that he believed that because of his 
superior talents the availability of affirmative action would tend to de-
value his performance in the eyes of whites, thus reducing his ultimate 
chances of success in a white-dominated society. [pp. 262-63] 
We are not given any further explanation as to why such a conclu-
sion would have to be the result of "self-deception." It would seem, in 
fact, to be an empirical issue whether, in a particular context, affirma-
tive action had this effect. Rosenfeld does not offer empirical evidence 
on the issue. Nor does he offer the kind of counterfactual dialogue 
that would give plausibility to the claim that the black man's conclu-
sion could not be upheld in a Habermasian ideal speech situation. 
Just as the basis for inferring self-deception is a bit mysterious in 
this example, it is difficult to see how the conclusions of our white 
male in the affirmative action dialogue should be revised. Once more, 
there might be a basis for such conclusions if we were comparing 
someone from an actually disadvantaged background with a privileged 
white male. But when affirmative action is applied in competitive mer-
itocratic contexts, based on racial or gender categories per se, there is 
the well-known problem that comparatively well-off members of the 
group will commonly be beneficiaries. 17 If such members are to be 
hired even when they are less qualified (as would be required by Ro-
senberg's definition of preferential treatment cited above) then the 
most controversial version of affirmative action would have been im-
plemented. Once again, it is hard to see how such conclusions can 
result from "reversible reciprocity" even when Habermas is invoked to 
rewrite some of the preferences that can be attributed to some of the 
participants. 
Rosenfeld offers one other strategy for resolving such disagree-
ments. He stipulates that when priorities among the conflicting claims 
do not emerge from the reversal of perspectives test, and when the 
intensity of feeling on each side of the issue is comparable, then the 
issue can be resolved by utilitarian calculations as to the balances of 
net preferences on the issues to be decided. He offers the example of a 
municipality's deciding between a swimming pool and tennis courts. 
Under these circumstances, if each resident switched places with every 
other resident, they would all realize that individual preferences for a 
swimming pool are no more intense than those for tennis courts. Ac-
cordingly, each resident would be justified in concluding that the prefer-
ences of others are not entitled to any greater deference than her own 
preference. 
17. JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 103·05, 121-30 
(1983). 
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... justice as reversibility would arguably be satisfied by a resolution 
of conflicts among such claims on the basis of calculations of net prefer-
ences or net utilities. [pp. 257-58] 
It is not clear why the balance of feeling about the issue should 
have become a criterion for evaluating the merits of the claims or in-
terests at stake on each side. Notorious difficulties plague the interper-
sonal comparison of intensities and the use of felt intensity as a 
criterion of interests. 18 Rosenfeld does not air these issues but simply 
stipulates this strategy. Furthermore, it is hard to see how Rosenfeld's 
approach could be employed to settle the issue of preferential treat-
ment. Both the candidate who is nonminority or male and the candi-
date who is minority or female or both are likely to feel equally 
intensely. However, if utilitarian calculations involving everyone's 
preferences were then invoked to settle the issue (in the manner Ro-
senfeld imagines for the swimming pool example), it is far from clear 
that preferential treatment would emerge. Preferential treatment does 
not enjoy widespread public support in opinion polls in this country.19 
In any case, this last strategy would render the issue dependent on the 
distribution of preferences that happened to be prevalent at a given 
time throughout the country. Whichever strategy Rosenfeld employs, 
it hardly seems that he has provided a more determinate basis for set-
tling this controversial issue than have rival philosophical approaches. 
In particular, it seems doubtful that Rosenfeld's effort to combine 
Kohlberg with Habermas can be taken, as he believes it should be, to 
constitute a theoretical strategy superior to Rawls' theory of justice. 
Rosenfeld objects to the Rawlsian approach becausr "the effect of the 
veil of ignorance is to remove from each individual that which makes 
his or her own perspective different from that of others" (p. 250). Ro-
senfeld concludes that behind the veil of ignorance, "the elimination of 
all differences makes reversibility essentially trivial" (p. 250). 
A Rawlsian might reply that the differences are eliminated in the 
original position because they are held to be irrelevant from a moral 
point of view. Behind the veil of ignorance I am not supposed to know 
my race or my class or my I.Q. because if I did, I could tailor princi-
ples to the advantage of people with those characteristics. Because the 
Kohlbergian version permits us to know about them, these differences 
may upset the emergence of any consensus from the moral decision 
procedure. Kohlberg has a relatively easy time when the issue is the 
18. For my previous overview of the problem, see JAMES S. FlsHKIN, TYRANNY AND LEGIT-
IMACY 20-25 (1979). 
19. In the 1990 national election study, respondents were asked a carefully balanced question 
that ended with "are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?" Respon-
dents in favor numbered 237 of 1007, or 23.54%, while respondents against numbered 698 of 
1007, or 69.31%. Warren E. Miller et al., American National Election Study 1990: Post-Elec-
tion Survey (1991) (on computer file at Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan). 
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life of Heinz's wife versus the profits of the druggist. But the system 
has more to overcome when the issue is the claim of a more qualified 
nonminority versus that of a less qualified minority - the problem 
Rosenfeld faces in his chosen controversial topic of preferential 
treatment. 
Despite these difficulties, there is the basis for an important insight 
in this book: it attempts to combine dialogue among actual people 
with the impartial perspectives of hypothetically rational choice. One 
important strand of liberal theory, actual consent, would emphasize 
real choices of real people. The actual consent of the governed binds 
in the way that a promise does. But actual consent, apart from its 
notorious ambiguities,20 also has the defect that we may, sometimes 
rightly, suspect the socialization and rationality that produces the con-
sent. To take an obvious case, if citizens are brainwashed or indoctri-
nated, we hardly view their conclusions as morally binding or 
legitimate. 
By contrast, the revival of liberal theory has been based on hypo-
thetical thought experiments that attempt to reform the biases of so-
cialization through some impartial decision procedure. These respond 
to the deficiencies in socialization and indoctrination through some 
mechanism requiring an impartial perspective. Rawls' veil of igno-
rance is only the most celebrated example. Ackerman's neutral dia-
logue, 21 the perfectly sympathetic spectator of the classical 
utilitarians, 22 and the gambling argument for average utility provide 
some other examples. The difficulty is that these mechanisms offer 
competing hypotheticals. Each offers a rival hypothetical choice pro-
cedure, but there is no actual commitment to any one of the competing 
candidates and no metaprocedure for deciding among the claims of 
the competing hypotheticals. They all make a putative claim to fair-
ness or impartiality. Furthermore, as the debate between Rawls and 
Harsanyi demonstrates, very slight alterations in the statement of the 
assumptions can lead to radically different principles. In that case the 
difference between assuming, behind the veil of ignorance, an equal 
chance of being any given person, and mere uncertainty about the like-
lihood of being any given person is enough to support average utility 
rather than maximin justice (requiring maximization of the minimum 
share of primary goods).23 
Actual and hypothetical choice strategies each have advantages 
and disadvantages in the theory of justice. If a theory were somehow 
20. For a good discussion, see Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent, in 4 PHILOSOPHY, 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 45, 51-62 (Peter Laslett et al. eds., 1972). 
21. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). 
22. For a good brief discussion, see RAWLS, supra note 1, at 183-88. 
23. For an extended discussion of these hypothetical choice strategies and their controversial 
claim to impartiality, see JAMES s. FISHKIN, THE DIALOGUE OF JUSTICE (forthcoming 1993). 
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to have the bindingness of actual commitments and the impartial char-
acter of recent hypothetical procedures, then a marriage of the two 
approaches might be more powerful than either taken singly. In sig-
nifi.cant ways, this is the attraction of what Rosenfeld tries to do with 
his combination of actual dialogue and impartial procedure. These 
criticisms, while focused on several particulars, should not obscure the 
promise of the general strategy. Actual agreements - actual choices 
- should be taken as binding provided they can be insulated from 
delegitimating charges that they result from coercion, brainwashing, 
or indoctrination. The theory of justice needs to be brought down to 
earth from imaginary thought experiments. Rosenfeld only charts a 
somewhat bewildering path, but his book points in the right direction. 
